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This paper documents the major transformation of higher education that has been underway in China
since 1999 and evaluates its potential global impacts. Reflecting China's commitment to continued
high growth through quality upgrading and the production of ideas and intellectual property as set
out in both the 10th (2001-2005) and 11th (2006-2010) five-year plans, this transformation focuses
on major new resource commitments to tertiary education and also embodies significant changes in
organizational form. This focus on tertiary education differentiates the Chinese case from other countries
who earlier at similar stages of development instead stressed primary and secondary education. The
number of undergraduate and graduate students in China has been grown at approximately 30% per
year since 1999, and the number of graduates at all levels of higher education in China has approximately
quadrupled in the last 6 years. The size of entering classes of new students and total student enrollments
have risen even faster, and have approximately quintupled. Prior to 1999 increases in these areas were
much smaller. Much of the increased spending is focused on elite universities, and new academic contracts
differ sharply from earlier ones with no tenure and annual publication quotas often used. All of these
changes have already had large impacts on China's higher educational system and are beginning to
be felt by the wider global educational structure. We suggest that even more major impacts will follow
in the years to come and there are implications for global trade both directly in ideas, and in idea derived
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This paper documents the major transformation of higher educational that has been underway 
in China since 1999 and evaluates its potential global impacts. Reflecting China’s commitment 
to continued high growth through quality upgrading and the production of ideas and 
intellectual property as set out in both the 10
th (2001-2005) and 11
th (2006-2010) five-year 
plans, this transformation focuses on major new resource commitments to tertiary education 
and also embodies significant changes in organizational form. The number of undergraduate 
and graduate students in China has been growing at approximately 30% per year since 1999, 
and the number of graduates at all levels of higher education in China has approximately 
quadrupled in the last 6 years. The size of entering classes of new students and total student 
enrollments have risen even faster, and have approximately quintupled. Prior to 1999 increases 
in these areas were much smaller. Much of the increased spending is focused on elite 
universities, and new academic contracts differ sharply from earlier ones, with no tenure and 
annual publication quotas often used. All of these changes have already had large impacts on 
China’s higher educational system and are beginning to be felt by the wider global educational 
structure. Skilled labor supply in China now equals around 40% of that in all OECD countries. 
The growth rate of student numbers is much higher than in the OECD. We suggest that even 
more major impacts will follow for these changes in the years to come and there are 
implications for global trade both directly in ideas, and in idea derived products. These changes, 
for now, seem relatively poorly documented in literature. 
The changes we document in what follows also reflect a wider strategy in China of 
attempting to upgrade both the quality and skill content of production through large increases 
in higher educational resource inputs, along with a series of other changes in economic policy 
in China. This strategy primarily reflects strategic decisions made at high policy levels in 
China, and is seemingly not driven by the demand side of labor markets defining potential 
requirements of labor of different types. One result so far has been a sharp increase in the 
number of individuals with high educational attainment in various areas independently of the 
 3size of respective job markets, and this has created significant short term problems of 
absorption and unemployment for labor associated with these activities. These education 
policies have also been a factor in China’s increasing inequality. The educational 
transformation underway in China seemingly differs from that in other low wage economies at 
either similar or earlier stages of development, in focusing heavily on tertiary education rather 
than on primary or secondary (unlike, say, India).   
We suggest that the potential implications for the global educational system are major. We 
discuss the relative size of changes in China’s labor force by category relative to the world 
supply of labor by type or profession; the possible impacts on academic performance outside 
China via potential international paper submissions and publications, and also how the global 
supply and trade in ideas and idea related products maybe affected. The paper also speculates 
on the effectiveness of these policies. In our final section we also briefly discuss the potential 
global implications of these changes in terms of the ways in which perceptions of the education 
growth link may change. China seems to be alone among lower income economies in having 
focused its educational transformation in recent years on the tertiary educational sector, but at 
the same time China is clearly undergoing radical change in many different areas of economic 
activity and the educational system is only one of these. Previous efforts in other countries to 
use educational transformation as a mechanism either to maintain high growth or to initiate 
episodes of high growth have generally been regarded as unsuccessful, but the focus has been 
primary and secondary education, not tertiary. In China’s case, these latest efforts seem to be 
motivated by a desire to maintain high growth by using educational transformation as the 
primary mechanism for skill upgrading and raising total factor productivity. If China succeeds, 
other countries may follow with higher educational competition between countries as a 
possible outcome.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out broad dimensions of the 
educational transformation underway in China, drawing on using the latest countrywide data. 
Section 3 analyzes the policy objectives behind these educational policies and how they relate 
to the broader development strategy now being used to maintain high growth in the China’s 
economy through various types of quality upgrading. Section 4 accesses the effectiveness of 
educational transformation policies. Section 5 assesses the wider global implications of the 
 4transformation underway in China and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2 The Dimensions of the Higher Educational Transformation in China 
The changes which have taken place in China’s higher educational system since 1999 are 
relatively poorly documented in available literature, but the changes are large and seemingly 
have major implications for economic activity both within China and globally since China is a 
large economy with a population of 1.3 billion. Below we set out some dimensions of the 
changes involved.   
2.1 Large increases in the number of students 
  The number of graduate students and undergraduate students in China has approximately 
quadrupled in the last 6 years (see Figure 1). Before 1999 the number of students both 
graduating and enrolling was stable. In 1998, the total number of graduates from tertiary 
education was 830,000; in 2005, it was 3,068,000, an increase by a factor of 3.7. The number 
of enrollments (both for new students and total students) has risen even faster, and has 
approximately quintupled between 1998 and 2005 (see Figure 2). The new student enrollment 
is 4.7 times larger in 2005 than in 1998. The total enrollment is 4.6 times larger in 2005 than in 
1998.  
Figure 1: The number of graduates from and entering students into   
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). 
 
2.2 More Ph.D. engineers and scientists in China by 2010 than in the US 
In engineering and sciences these changes have been especially pronounced (see Figure 3). It 
is widely recognized that there will be substantially more Ph.D. engineers and scientists in 
China in 2010 than in the US, since on a flow basis China produces three times the number of 
engineers compared to the US. Among 24-year-olds in 2001 who had a Bachelor of Science or 
Bachelor of Arts degree, only 5% in the U.S. were engineers, compared to 39% in China and 
19% or more in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (see Table 1). The U.S. also compares poorly 
to European countries bachelor's degrees awarded in the fields of engineering and science.
1 
R.E. Smalley, a Nobel Prize-winning scientist from Rice University recently concluded that by 
2010 90% of all Ph.D. physical scientists and engineers in the world will be Asian living in 
Asia.
2 And among Asian Ph.D. engineers and scientists, most will be produced by China. 
National Science Foundation data shows that U.S. is now also producing fewer engineers than 
from other parts of the world, and particularly from Asia (see Figure 4).
3 
                                                        
1  See Herbold (2006).   
2  As for 2.   
3  See National Science Foundation (2006) as well as National Science Foundation (2007). 
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Figure 3: The number of China’s scientists and engineers   
(Unit: 10,000 persons) 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2001, 2006). 
 
Table 1: BS/BA degrees among 24-year olds in 2001 by country 





USA 1,253.1 59.5 4.75% 
China 567.9 219.6 38.67% 
South Korea  209.7 56.5 26.94% 
Taiwan 117.4 26.6 22.66% 
Japan 542.3 104.5 19.27% 









 7Figure 4: Engineering graduates in the U.S., India and China (2005) 












Source: Fortune Magazine (2005). 
 
2.3 Sharply changed access to higher education for urban and rural 
households  
A further feature of China’s higher educational transformation is considerably improved 
access to higher education for rural households. As a result, the gap in access between rural and 
urban areas is gradually diminishing. Data from “Science and Engineering Indicators 2006” 
shows that number of university degrees per 100 24-year-olds is 5 in 2003 for the whole of 
China. In the mid 1990s, conditional upon being in the urban sector (including counties and 
town) the probability of high school graduates obtaining admission to university was around 
0.3. That probability in 2005 is almost 0.5.
4 Admission rates are higher than these since not all 
high school graduates register for high education entrance exams, and entrance exams are 
organized through all over China. The data we report in Table 2 shows that admission rates for 
both urban and rural registrants have increased sharply. The proportion of urban students in 
total admissions is decreasing, while the proportion of rural students in total admissions is 
                                                        
4  We conclude this from data on numbers of high school graduates from “Educational Statistical Yearbook of China” and data 
on numbers of admissions to universities from Ministry of Education. The probabilities in 1996 and 2005 are 0.30 and 0.45, 
respectively. 
 8increasing (see Figure 5). Admission rates for the population in rural areas has risen much 
faster than admission rates for the urban population (see Table 3).   
Entry into tertiary education in China for now is still largely restricted to urban residents, but 
with increasing attention being paid now to social harmony as a broad policy direction in China, 
educational attainment data are likely to show ever more rural participation in the years ahead. 
Current data show evidence of this trend. 
 
Table 2: China’s higher education entrance exam registrants and admissions 




















1996 52.03  50.75  111.75  152.48  46.56%  33.28% 
1997 53.15  52.66  123.64  157.05  42.99%  33.53% 
1998 59.82  55.77  142.22  173.79  42.06%  32.09% 
1999 84.47  74.40  157.02  180.30  53.80%  41.26% 
2000  116.00 106.00 193.00 196.00 60.10%  54.08% 
2001  150.55 133.76 230.59 227.40 65.29%  58.82% 
2002  181.90 168.14 263.41 267.35 69.06%  62.89% 
2003  214.40 213.99 295.73 324.56 72.50%  65.93% 
2004  246.64 273.04 334.60 396.87 73.71%  68.80% 
2005  269.27 303.81 393.85 482.96 68.37%  62.91% 






 9Figure 5: The proportion of urban and rural students in new student admissions 
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Source: as for Table 2.   
 
Table 3: China’s higher education admission rates for urban and rural population 


















1996 52.03  50.75  37304  85085  0.14%  0.06% 
1997 53.15  52.66  39449  84177  0.13%  0.06% 
1998 59.82  55.77  41608  83153  0.14%  0.07% 
1999 84.47  74.40  43748  82038  0.19%  0.09% 
2000 116.00  106.00  45906  80837  0.25%  0.13% 
2001 150.55  133.76  48064  79563  0.31%  0.17% 
2002 181.90  168.14  50212  78241  0.36%  0.21% 
2003 214.40  213.99  52376  76851  0.41%  0.28% 
2004 246.64  273.04  54283  75705  0.45%  0.36% 
2005 269.27  303.81  56212  74544  0.48%  0.41% 
Source: Admissions data from Table 2; Population data from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2006).   
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2.4 The promotion of elite universities and consolidation of other universities 
A further feature of recent Chinese higher educational policy has been both to promote 
so-called “elite” universities and also to consolidate other universities and reduce their numbers. 
Elite universities are the top ten universities in China, which receive the largest education 
funds from central and local governments. They have priority in selecting students through 
national entrance exams and have the best faculty and research resources in China. The focus 
of policy is to elevate a small number of Chinese universities to world class status, and both 
strengthen them and make them bigger. All universities in China have in recent years been 
subject to directives from central ministries to substantially increase their numbers of 
undergraduate students, even if significant increase in infrastructure to handle this increase in 
student numbers lags. Increases in undergraduates of 30% a year have common in many 
universities are as a result of this policy.   
In many of China’s major cities there has also been consolidation of universities, with, say, 4 
or 5 small universities in the city consolidated into a large single entity as a way of improving 
their ranking. This in part reflects incentives pursued by local governments so as to secure 
more central funding. Data from the Chinese Ministry of Education show that 431 
consolidations occurred between January 12, 1990 and May 15, 2006 and 60% of these 
occurred between 1999 and 2006.
5 Many of the consolidations involved elite universities. But 
this also partly reflects a Chinese government reorientation of higher education in the mid 
1990s. under the “211 Higher Education Development Project”
6 put forward at the time. This 
advocated priority development of about 100 higher educational institutions so that they could 
rank among the top universities in the world. For example, Beijing Medical University was 
incorporated into Peking University and was formally renamed Faculty of Health Science, 
Peking University in 2000. Eventually, the Central Arts and Design College was incorporated 
into Tsinghua University and was renamed Faculty of Arts and Design, Tsinghua University in 
1999.  
                                                        
5  China’s Ministry of Education (2006a).   
6  Announced in 1993, Project 211 is to identify for the 21st century 100 institutions and a number of disciplines of 'world 
standard' by preferential treatment. See Lang, D. W. and Q. Zha (2004). 
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2.5 A change from quantity- to quality-orientation in education 
These higher educational changes have also been accompanied by a change in focus from 
quantity flow through in education in the pre 1999 period, to an elevated emphasis on quality 
post 1999. Educational attainment in China is now subject to firm quantity indicators which are 
designed to drive continued improvement of educational quality by participating institutions. 
Funding is now longer simply a matter of increasing the numbers of students enrolled and 
universities and institutions of high education in China are now subject to extraordinary 
pressures to upgrade themselves in terms of objective rankings. High priority is placed on 
international rankings taken as publications in international journals, citations, and 
international cooperation. These are used as demonstration of elevation of attainment for each 
educational institution and funding is directly linked to these indicators. Some of this focus on 
improved educational attainment in China seems to be spontaneous and itself accelerated by 
the policy process that exerts the pressure. It is now accepted as important for universities and 
related institutions to achieve publication in journals of good ranking and what is generated by 
publication citations counts equally for Chinese scholars in appointment, maintenance of 
position, and promotion. Indicators of educational attainments in terms of international 
rankings across countries, publications of papers, and citations feed directly into annual 
performance indicators for Chinese faculty in an ongoing process which goes substantially 
beyond the once in a lifetime tenure system outside China. It is not uncommon for an annual 
target of three international publications to be set for faculty members, with termination of 
employment to occur on non fulfillment. Universities themselves may also be given targets for 
improvements in international rankings and activities. The resulting changes in quality of 
educational performance both by educational institutions overall and individual faculty 
members and students are striking. For instance, China’s share of Asian science and 
engineering articles was increased from 14.54% in 1998 to 22.43% in 2003, with an annual 
growth rate of 9%.   
The primary stress on education attainment is on traditional academic disciplines, especially 
sciences, but social sciences and business also enter. Arts has been given relatively low priority. 
 12Conventional vocational training as practiced in OECD countries in professions in trades such 
as plumbers, electricians, travel agents and hairdressers has been given low priority, but more 
recently vocational training has been paid more attention than before. So far, there is limited 
professional certification for trades in China and the focus on vocational training has been on 
professions -- doctors, nurses, lawyers, dentists and others.   
Later in the paper we outline what some of the dimensions of change quality are and stress 
that both quality and quantity educational changes are occurring together. It is also important to 
stress that the increase in student numbers in both undergraduate and graduate programs of 
over 30% per year is much higher than the underlying growth rate of China’s economy, and 
these changes are also taking place during a period of demographic transition to one-child per 
family.  
 
2.6 Data on China’s educational transformation 
While the educational transformation underway since 1999 in China seems major and radical, 
surprisingly enough, available data on a system-wide basis is surprisingly sparse. We have 
assembled data on numbers of students both entering and graduating by area of study and 
educational institution. These areas of attainments include sciences (physics, chemistry, 
engineering, computer science and related fields), social sciences (including economics, 
political science, psychology and other disciplines), business and business related studies, and 
also professions, including doctors, nurses, and lawyers.   
In many of these areas, particularly in business, there are now large private costs involved 
with educational participation for households in China. Educational attainment is given high 
priority in the social structure and the gains in terms of upward social mobility and income 
benefits associated with educational attainment are perceived to be large. Entry into education 
seemingly generates social inequalities, which is a source of current concern in China given the 
rapid increases in income and wealth inequality in recent years.
7 There are some data, for 
instance, that suggest that it is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of urban and rural 
households to devote considerable incomes to tutoring expenditures, so that entrance into an 
                                                        
7  See Zhang (2006) as well as Li (2005). 
 13educational institution can be attained by their children.
8 A survey conducted by Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (hereafter CASS) shows that education expenditures for children 
ranks No.1 in consumption categories for Chinese households, and overwhelms pension and 
house expenditures.
9 The proportion of tuition and other education fees to per capita net 
income for rural households has increased from 16.6% in 1996 to 33.2% in 2003.
10 These costs 
are additional to the time costs of parents.   
It is also not uncommon for students to study subject material from the age of 6 at which 
point that may on average devote 8.6 hours a day at school, with some spending 12 hours a day 
in the classroom, according to a survey conducted by the Chinese Youth and Children Research 
Center (CYCRC).
11 The survey also claimed that the majority of children spend longer hours at 
school than their parents spend at work. All of these features thus feed into an educational 
process which is now central to both China’s economy and social structure.   
 
2.6.1 Countrywide data by subject area of study and institution type 
Table 4 shows numbers of students in regular HEIs (higher education institutions, including 
universities, colleges, short-term colleges and vocational institutions). In Table 5 we report data 
on postgraduate student entry, enrollment and graduation by area of study. Tables 6 and 7 









                                                        
8  See Hu (2005).   
9  See Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2005).   
10  See Peng and Chen (2007).   
11  See [49] Xinhua News Agency (2007). 
 14Table 4: Numbers of students in regular HEIs by field of study in China (2005) 
(unit: persons)
  Entrants  Total Enrollments  Graduates 
 
Total 
Normal  Short-cycle 
Total 
Normal  Short-cycle 
Total 
Normal  Short-cycle 
  Courses  Courses  Courses  Courses  Courses  Courses 
Total  5044581  2363647  2680934  15617767  8488188  7129579  3067956  1465786  1602170 
                   
Philosophy  1797  1797  0  6323  6323  0  1275  1275  0 
Economics  264219  145512  118707  857757  518989  338768  162977  80710  82267 
Law  199521  108779  90742  697174  414309  282865  163529  76140  87389 
Education  315638  86080  229558  1022708  307402  715306  280134  50342  229792 
Literature and 
foreign language 
760475  435484  324991  2318665  1455454  863211  415206  226903  188303 
History  13379  13379  0  49390  49390  0  10694  10694  0 
Science  270147  268061  2086  967908  959757  8151  164867  163076  1791 
Engineering  1809426  739668  1069758  5477207  2699776  2777431  1090986  517225  573761 
Agriculture  97188  45674  51514  308107  174783  133324  69531  35419  34112 
Medicine  338563  147726  190837  1132165  627249  504916  202577  96011  106566 
Management  974228  371487  602741  2780363  1274756  1505607  506180  207991  298189 











Table 5: Numbers of postgraduate students by field of study in China (2005) 
 (unit:  persons)
  Entrants  Total Enrollments  Graduates 
 
Total 
Doctor’s  Master’s 
Total 
Doctor’s  Master’s 
Total 
Doctor’s  Master’s 
  Degree  Degree  Degree  Degree  Degree  Degree 
Total  364831  54794  310037  978610  191317  787293  189728  27677  162051 
                   
Philosophy  4414  731  3683  11632  2395  9237  2249  436  1813 
Economics  18612  2662  15950  49752  9695  40057  10930  1617  9313 
Law  24770  2305  22465  65272  7520  57752  14103  1191  12912 
Education  12357  1005  11352  29855  3029  26826  5101  455  4646 
Literature  28962  2334  26628  73000  7543  65457  13314  1216  12098 
History  5249  946  4303  13790  3180  10610  2657  547  2110 
Science  45193  10214  34979  120510  33059  87451  22028  5458  16570 
Engineering  131345  20983  110362  369738  79714  290024  72941  9427  63514 
Agriculture  13864  2253  11611  36061  7386  28675  6038  1093  4945 
Medicine  38340  6738  31602  100343  20236  80107  19405  4291  15114 
Military  219  34  185  546  122  424  114  22  92 
Management  41506  4589  36917  108111  17438  90673  20848  1924  18924 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present summary statistics for Chinese universities and colleges (not 
including short-term colleges
12) by type and enrolment size. This includes specialized 
universities including universities of business, international trade, tax affairs, accounting, 
auditing and other specialties. Each of these categories is in the data we present. 
 
 
                                                        
12  Short-term colleges refer to those colleges which only offer 2 or 3 year programmes.   
 16Table 6: Numbers of Chinese universities and colleges   










Total 682  411  89  115  67 
Comprehensive Universities  124  97  13  11  3 
Science and technology  185  148  20  14  3 
Agriculture 33  28  1  3  1 
Forestry 6  4  2  0  0 
Medical and pharmacy  76  12  18  35  11 
Normal (teacher’s training)  125  79  21  24  1 
Language and Literacy  14  3  1  5  5 
Economics and finance  47  31  7  8  1 
Law and politics science  17  3  1  3  10 
Physical education  14  0  1  5  8 
Arts 29  1  0  4  24 
Minority 
(Ethnic nationalities) 














                                                        
13  The statistics come from China Ministry of Education. 










Total 1792  701  1091  921 
Of which: 
Non-state/private colleges 
250 27  223  217 
Comprehensive University  380  146  234  228 
Natural Science and 
Technology 
648 188  460  430 
Agriculture 74  32  42  40 
Forestry 18  6  12  11 
Medicine and Pharmacy  115  76  39  7 
Normal (teacher’s training)  182  117  65  5 
Language and Literacy  34  14  20  18 
Economics and finance  169  50  119  100 
Law and politics science  64  17  47  30 
Physical education  26  14  12  11 
Arts 66  29  37  37 
Minority 
(Ethnic nationalities) 
16 12  4  4 
















1997 1020  603  337  80 
1998 1022  590  331  101 
1999 1071  597  313  161 
2000 1041  599  258  184 
2001 1225  597  242  386 
2002 -  -  -  - 
2003 1552  644  197  711 
2004 1731  684  1047  872 
2005 1792  701  1091  921 
Source: China’s Ministry of Education (2006c).   
 
Table 8 reports the changes in numbers of Chinese higher educational institutions between 
1997 and 2005. The rapid increase in total numbers mostly reflects expansion of numbers in 
short-term colleges and vocational colleges. Numbers of universities and colleges also rise, but 
not by too much. At university and college level, growth depends more on the enlarged size of 
each institution rather than the increased number of total institutions. At short-term college and 
vocational college level, growth relies more on expansion in the number of institutions.   
 
2.6.2 Funding sources for China’s higher educational institutions 
We next discuss funding sources for China’s higher educational institutions. There are three 
separate sources--government funds, commercial income from university-owned companies 
and entities, tuition and other educational charges such as fees paid by students and parents, 
and we discuss each.   
Government funding for China’s leading universities is largely programme based. In 1998 
 19under a special “985” Project,
14 10 of China's leading universities were given three-year grants 
in excess of 30 billion RMB (current price) for quality improvements (Wang, 2002). Included 
in the first round of 985 Project grants were Peking, Tsinghua, Fudan, Zhejiang, and Nanjing 
Universities.
15 Peking and Tsinghua universities, the top two ranked institutions, each received 
1.8 billion RMB. Afterwards, the Ministry of Education cooperated with provincial or 
municipal governments and other departments to also develop Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
Xi’an Jiaotong University, Science and Technology University of China and Harbin Industry 
University (see Table 9). According to 2003 data,
16 those Project 985 universities in this phase 
of support accounted for only 1% of the total higher education enrollments, but their key labs 
accounted for almost a half of the whole annual research funds, 20% of post-graduate student 
enrolment and 30% of doctoral candidates. Project 985 funds provided these universities with 
considerable support. These grants were awarded in addition to financial support provided by a 
further 211 Project under a separate program aimed at developing 100 quality universities for 
China for the 21st century. In 2004, the second phase of the 985 Project was launched and the 
number of universities covered was enlarged to 30.
17 
China’s 11
th Five-Year Plan provides detailed information on the amount of resources 
devoted to improved educational attainment within the Chinese higher educational system. 
Much of this information is unfortunately not consolidated in a consistent way across 
institutions. Generally, the financing arrangements involved are institution specific, and no 
more information is given by the institutions themselves.   
We have been able to collect some information for a small number of HEIs and top elite 
institutions in China and use this to generate data on the amount of government funding 
flowing into these institutions. Table 9 provides this data with funding in the year of 2004 
categorized by their sizes. The top 11 universities (those universities included in the 985 
Project at the first phase) received more than 17.43 billion RMB from government funds in 
                                                        
14  Project 985 was officially approved in May 1998 during the centennial anniversary of Peking University, when the Ministry 
of Education appealed to the top leadership for reserving China's 1% of its annual revenue in 3 consecutive years, from 1999 to 
2001, for the purpose of building world class universities in China. The objective of the large extra investment is to promote 
the around 10 universities into world well-known universities.   
15  Both Peking University and Tsinghua University were granted $225 million each over five years, while Nanjing University 
and Shanghai Jiaotong University received $150 million each. See World Education News & Reviews (2006).   
16  See Zhou Mansheng, Deputy Director-General of National Center for Education Development Research. “Developing the 
Chinese High-Level Universities, Enhancing the Competitiveness”.   
17  See World Education News & Reviews (2006). 
 202004. The universities in Level 2 primarily appeared in only the second phase of the 985 
Project. Among all 32 universities (more than 500 million RMB) in Level 1 and 2, 29 
universities obtained support from the 985 Project.
18  
In addition to government funding, higher education institutions in China, also generate 
significant support by engaging in commercial activities. These include companies and other 
entities owned by the institutions and which the institutions operate. Profits from these 
activities to the universities along with fees collected from participating students. Information 
on funding from these sources is set out in Table 10. The scope and size of the educational 
transformation which these resource commitments imply is clear from these data. In 2004, all 
university-owned companies and entities in China make total revenue of 96.93 billion RMB, in 
which they refund universities 1.75 billion RMB.
19 In 1998, the total revenue was 31.2 billion 
RMB, and payment to universities was 1.5 billion RMB.
20 The refund to universities is 
growing slowly, much less than the growth of income and profit (see Table 11). However, the 














                                                        
18  Liu, Zhimin. “Study of the Status of Agriculture and Forestry Colleges and Universities in China in Light of Popular 
National College and University Ratings”. Mimeo. Available online: http://jiaoyu.ustc.edu.cn/qkln/2007/2/2007xdh2-10.doc  
19  See China’s Ministry of Education (2005). 
20  See Liu (2001). 
 21Table 9: Education funding for elite universities in China (2004) 





Total Funding for 
universities in the same 
level 
Name of Top   
Elite Universities 
Funding of Top 
Elite Universities 
Level 1:   
Top Elite Universities 
--More than 1000 





Peking University  24.08 
Zhejiang University  18.74 
Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 
14.61 
Harbin Institute of 
Technology 
14.43 









Wuhan University  10.48 
Jilin University  10.47 
Nanjing University  10.46 
Level 2: 
500-1000 million RMB 
21 146.02  -  - 
Level 3: 
300-500 million RMB 
38 143.31  -  - 
Level 4: 
200-300 million RMB 
53 126.75  -  - 





 22Table 10: Income earned by university-owned companies and entities (2005) 
(Unit: billion RMB) 
rank  Name of University 
Revenue 
of University-owned Companies 
and Entities 
1 Peking  University  26.76 
2 Tsinghua  University  19.83 
3 Zhejiang  University  5.73 
4 Northeastern  University  3.53 
5 
China University of Petroleum 
(Eastern China） 
3.01 
6 Wuhan  University  2.28 
7 Fudan  University  2.27 
8 Tongji  University  2.24 
9  Harbin Institute of Technology  2.02 
10  Xi’an JiaoTong University  1.81 
11  Shanghai Jiao Tong University  1.57 
12  Huazhong University of Science & Technology  1.23 
13 Zhongshan  University  1.06 










 23Table 11: Details of university-owned companies and entities 
(Unit: billion RMB) 
Year  Number of companies  Revenue Profit  Refund  to  universities 
1998 5928  312.33  25.34  1.50 
1999 5444  379.03  30.53  1.60 
2000 5451  484.55  45.64  1.69 
2001 5039  602.98  48.17  1.83 
2002 5047  720.08  45.93  1.72 
2003 4839  826.67  42.98  1.8 
2004 4563  969.3  49.93  1.74 
Sources: China’s Ministry of Education (1998-2005). 
 
Before the higher educational transformation began in 1999, the Chinese government was 
the main funding source for higher education institutions in China. But from 2001 on, private 
funding (tuition and fee payment) covers more than 50% of total education expenditures.
21 An 
even larger resource commitment is the time commitment of participates in the educational 
process. The educational activity by students participating in higher education implies a large 
investment in human capital for China. This is reflected not only in the time spent in education 
once admitted to the institution, but also in the time spent in obtaining entry into the 
educational institutions. This can involve 10 to 15 years of prior activity in education and 
extraordinary time commitments from the age of 4 to the age of 18 to 20. Some survey data 
reports, for stance, 40% junior middle school students work for more than 12 hours per day, 7 
days a week and 58.3% students work for 6 days a week, to prepare for the entrance exam to 
high school.
22 One can realistically claim, that the educational process in China is a central part 
of mechanism generating a highly educated, well motivated and hard working labor force in 
China. Casual observation indicates that Chinese people work extraordinary lengths of time 
and with high effort, and in the process generate enormous energy and drive which is central to 
China’s extraordinary growth process. China’s educational transformation can thus be seen in 
                                                        
21  National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005).   
22 See  http://gs.studentboss.com/xiaoyuan/newsjj.php?id=4511  
 24this way as a central element underpinning the sustainability of current China’s high-growth 
performance.  
 
3 Educational Transformation as Part of China’s Wider Development 
Strategy 
We next turn to the broad policy objectives underlying the educational transformation in China. 
Current thinking in the Chinese government treats the educational transformation of China as 
part of China’s broader development strategy. This educational transformation strategy is part 
of a wider strategy in place for a number of years designed to maintain growth in the China’s 
economy through various forms of quality upgrading.   
Many of the details of the elements of the strategy are in the 11
th 5-Year Plan, but were also 
set out in the earlier 9
th and 10
th 5-year plans which provided detailed policies aimed to 
maintain China’s growth process.
23 The 11
th 5-Year Plan laid down action guidelines for a five 
year period aimed at achieving an "all-round well-off society" by 2020. Currently, the 
construction of a "harmonious society" based on a "scientific outlook of development" is the 
focus of the Chinese government.
24 
This so-called scientific outlook for Chinese development seeks human-oriented, balanced 
and all-dimensional sustainable development. It consists of five initiatives: (1) harmonization 
in the development of urban and rural areas (greater priority to the development of rural areas 
and solving problems concerning farmers), (2) harmonization in regional development (greater 
assistance to less developed areas), (3) harmonization between economic and social 
development (expansion of employment opportunities and enhancement of social security and 
public services, such as medical care and education), (4) harmonization between economic 
development and the human and natural environment (greater emphasis on resource 
preservation and the protection of the natural environment), and (5) harmonization between 
domestic development and integration into the global economy (acceleration of domestic 
market growth while internationally opening-up).   
                                                        
23  See Fan (2006). 
24 See  Ma  (2006). 
 25The 11th Five-Year Plan aims to shift China's economic and social policies away from the 
priority of "getting rich first" by equally stressing "common prosperity," and highlighting the 
need to create a "harmonious society." The policy of getting rich first was based on ideas 
proposed by Deng Xiaoping, the reform architect of China in the 1980s who argued that the 
whole country would eventually become rich by allowing some people and regions to prosper 
first. This idea ran contrary to the principle of absolute equality adhered to by Mao Zedong, 
and was aimed to stimulate people's desire to work and get rich. This has served as the driving 
force behind China's rapid economic growth beginning in the 1980s, but has also resulted in 
widening disparities between the rich and the poor. In order to deliver the fruits of economic 
development more broadly to the whole country, the latest proposals call for the establishment 
of a social safety net--social security and medial care systems, insurance schemes for 
unemployment and labor accidents, and other elements--in addition to creating jobs, narrowing 
regional disparities, and resolving the so-called "three agriculture-related problems," namely, 
agriculture, peasants and rural villages. In particular, the plan calls for increasing government 
expenditures to enhance public goods and services, with a spending emphasis on infrastructure 
development and education, in order to modernize rural areas. Education, especially higher 
education, plays an important role in the 11
th 5-Year Plan.   
In the 11
th 5-Year Plan, a strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education 
and strengthening the country through improving human resources is a central element. 
Education is given priority status, with quality-oriented education a main theme, and especially 
improving the quality of higher education. The Chinese government seeks to promote an 
all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of educational institutions.   
The main tasks for the higher educational development strategy in the 11
th 5-Year Plan are as 
follows. The gross enrollment rate of higher education is to reach 25% of each entering age 
cohort by 2010 and the total enrollment of higher education is to hit 30 million.
25 In the 
meantime, vocational training, further education and adult education of various forms will 
receive more emphasis with the establishment of a learning society. There is also stress on 
improving the abilities of teachers to implement quality-oriented education. Reforming and 
improving the examination and evaluation component of the system is seen as a key and in 
                                                        
25  The State Council of China (2007).   
 26accordance with the demand for quality-oriented higher education.   
To promote balanced and sustainable development of higher education area in China, the 
11
th 5-Year Plan sets out concrete measures to improve the quality of tertiary education.
26 The 
“211 Projects” and “985 Project” are to be continued, with an emphasis on technology 
innovation, cultivating talents with creativity, and improving the capacity for self-innovation, 
so that top universities in China become an important force in an increasingly innovative nation. 
Programs of quality improvement are to be implemented, and a quality evaluation system 
designed to fulfill the objective of quality-upgrading orientation change. Also, the Chinese 
government seeks to deepen reforms of technology innovation to generate an educational 
system which integrates learning, research and production activity together. The government 
encourages universities and research institutions to place priority on original and integrative 
innovation, to improve ability in applied research and transform technology in industrial and 
commercial production.   
To improve the quality of teachers, a strategy of “developing the institution through human 
resources” in higher education is emphasized with a focus on a group of academic leaders with 
international excellence. There is stress placed on producing a group of middle-aged and young 
leading academics who can undertake national key tasks and participate in international 
competition.  
“Fair Play” in education is also emphasized. There is an objective that public education be 
promoted in ways that are open, fair and equal access to higher education should prevail in 
China. The government is to improve facilitation mechanisms for poorer students in HEIs, with 
student loans as a major factor so that no student will be denied access to higher education 
because of financial difficulties. While these objectives are commendable, there have been 
difficulties in implementation. Chinese banks have been reluctant to lend money to poor 
students, and often ask them to return the loan before they graduate. If poor students cannot 
return funds before they graduate, they are not authorized to receive certificates of graduation 
and degrees and their chance of finding good jobs is small. In the 11
th 5-Year Plan, the 
government commits itself to a “Sunshine Program” to ensure the recruitment process by 
universities is open, fair and justifiable. The government also acknowledges the importance of 
                                                        
26  The Press Conference of the State Council Information Office (2006).   
 27creating employment for university graduates and encourages them to take jobs at grass-root 
level.  
These plans are complex in both specificity and form. Some of the details are set out in the 
Whalley and Zhou (2007) who discuss the 11
th 5-Year Plan more broadly. The educational 
component of the 11
th 5-Year Plan is clear in providing for large injections of funds into 
China’s tertiary educational system. Education is a major focus over the 5 year period of the 
plan, with the proportion of education expenditures to GDP increasing to 4% in 2010, from 
3.4% in 2002. Much of the additional spending is focused on the elite universities, a group of 
around 20 universities in China, which are thought to have the best students and the capability 
to grow and mature into major global educational institutions which are comparable to those in 
the OECD. The research component of university activities is also seen as a central element in 
generating new ideas and eventually process and production methods which will improve 
profitability. Educational improvement in both research and student generation is thus seen as a 
central element of a continued high Chinese growth process.   
Along with a focus on elite universities, there is also a focus on improving the talent pool in 
China by raising the quality of available talent and particularly for higher levels of the talent 
pool. There is some evidence of reversal “brain drain” to China consistent with this policy. 
David Zweig (2006) points out that “a reverse brain drain is underway in mainland China. The 
number of returnees hit 30,000 in 2005, up from 7,000 in 1999." Data from Chinese Ministry 
of Education shows that in 2005, the total number of returnees is 35,000; in 2004, the number 
is 25,000; in 2003, the number is around 20,100.
27 The number of returnees is thus 
continuously increasing. Also, the production of a high level talent pool within China has 
accelerated after the educational transformation policies were put in place.   
Some educational funds are focused on providing resource packages to encourage 
researchers abroad to return to Chinese universities, often in conjunction with enterprises. 
Stress is placed on combining enterprise related research development activity with similar 
activities undertaken in research institutions. The objective is to achieve an improvement in the 
international stature of education institutions in China, with links and contacts with education 
institutions abroad to be encouraged. Funding is provided for Chinese graduate students to 
                                                        
27  China’s Ministry of Education (2004, 2005). 
 28spend time abroad to interact with members of the international research community. China's 
State Council claims that China will boost R&D investment to 2% of gross domestic product in 
2010 and 2.5% by 2020 and these activities are part of this effort. Total R&D spending in 
China in 2005 -- not including foreign investment -- reached $29.4 billion, rising steadily from 
$11.13 billion in 2000. Figure 6 reports the funding for science and technology activities in 
China, which is increasing and 1999 is a key point in the growth trend.   
 
Figure 6: China’s funding size for Science and Technology (S&T) activities   
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  F u n d in g fo r S & T  A c tiv itie s  (100  m illio n  yuan)  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2001, 2006). 
 
All these elements of China’s educational transformation are part of a process which feeds 
this transformation into the overall growth strategy. This strategy in turn proceeds on the 
assumption that China’s export growth rate of 30% per year (which implies a rough doubling 
of China’s international trade on average every two or one half years) will continue. In the 
process China will focus less on simple labor intensive manufactured products such as clothing, 
since it is believed China will run out of international markets in their products. A central 
element of a long term growth strategy is increasing quality of existing products and 
establishing new product lines. These will cover all products, from textiles and clothing, to 
chemicals and to sophisticated electronics, including computer technology design and 
eventually management of higher quality service related activities, including accounting, 
consulting and related activities such as sophisticated banking. These are all seen as part of the 
 29growth process and educational transformation is a route to this goal.   
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the transformation in higher education in China is 
only part for a wide overall growth strategy, and there is equal focus on other elements, as 
improved research development tax credits which have already been targeted towards specific 
industries and zones in the country. There is also a focus on large mega projects involving 
technology, infrastructure and other areas. Many of these are set out in Whalley and Zhou 
(2007). Maintaining progress on all these fronts is central to China’s policy with education and 
the generation of ideas and talent as key to the effort. 
 
4 Evaluating the Impacts of China’s Educational Transformation 
Policies 
We next discuss the effectiveness of the education policies in China we discuss above. The 
potential benefits to China are in large part reflected in estimates of the rate of return to 
education in China. But we also note the central issue of the extent to which the educational 
process in China serves as a screening device, and if so whether more efficient screening is 
available. We also suggest that in part entry to tertiary education in China is motivated by 
incentives to relocate abroad in high wage countries using education as the visa obtaining 
mechanism. To the extent this is true the soul return to China from expanded education is 
smaller than the private return. We finally discuss the impacts of China’s educational 
transformation on total factor productivity, and implicitly on growth performance.   
4.1 Estimates of rates of return on education in China 
A central issue in evaluating the effectiveness of educational transformation policies in 
China is assessing the rates of return on educational investment in China. In this area there are 
sharply differing results from available studies.   
One recent study by Heckman and Li (2004) estimates the return on higher education in 
China allowing for heterogeneous returns and for self-selection into schooling using micro data 
from China in 2000 since in Chinese urban areas, heterogeneity in returns is substantial. They 
 30draw an earlier work by Carneiro et al. (2001), which emphasizes comparative advantage in the 
labor market for schooling. Their estimate is that for a randomly selected young person from an 
urban area (in six provinces-Beijing, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Liaoning and Shaanxi) 
those attending a 4-year college experience a 43% increase in lifetime earnings (nearly 11% 
annually) in 2000, compared with just 36% (nearly 9% annually) for those who do not attend. 
Their estimate is that on average the return to four-year college attendance in the sense of 
average treatment effect (ATE)
28 is very high, 43% on average and 11% annually for young 
people in the urban areas in China. These estimates are all higher than the conventional OLS 
(ordinary least squares) estimates (29%, annual returns of 7.25%) of a Mincer model applied 
by them to the same data, which in turn are higher than the OLS estimates reported for earlier 
time periods. Heckman and Li (2004) suggest that these estimates imply that, after more than 
twenty years of economic reform with market orientation, the average return to education in 
China measured by OLS or ATE has increased substantially when compared with figures for 
early period.
29 Skills are now being rewarded more adequately than they have been in the past 
in China.   
The Heckman and Li (2004) estimates of the rate of return on years of schooling in China 
suggest that the social return to China’s educational transformation policies is high and helps in 
maintaining high growth (see Section 4.4). However, other recent studies by Chinese scholars 
have cast doubt on the size of the Heckman return estimates. These studies suggest that the rate 
of return may be much more modest. For instance, Wang (2007) estimates the rates of return to 
years of schooling for migrant workers and urban local workers, and her estimates are 4.6% 
and 5.7% respectively in 2001 and 5.0% and 6.7% respectively in 2005. It implies that hourly 
earnings of migrant workers increased by 4.6% for every additional years of schooling, and 
hourly earnings of urban local workers increased by 5.7% for every additional years of 
schooling, holding all other factors fixed. Wang’s estimates are, however, general return to 
schooling, not specific to college education.   
Other studies, however, suggest that rates of return to education in China will continue to 
                                                        
28 Average Treatment Effect (ATE): The term ‘treatment effect’ refers to the causal effect of a binary (0–1) variable on an 
outcome variable of scientific or policy interest. Let Y1i denote the potential earnings of individual i if he were to receive 
training and let Y0i denote the potential earnings of individual i if not. Let E[·] denote the mathematical expectation operator, 
i.e., the population average of a random variable. ATE=E[Y1i – Y0i].  
29  Chow (2001) presents estimates of OLS-generated rates of return in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 31increase. Zhang and Zhao (2002), Li (2003), and Yang (2004) show that there is evidence that 
in the past 15 years, rates of returns on schooling in China have increased. Fleisher et al. (2004) 
estimate that the OLS return to college education increased sharply between 1995 and 2002. In 
the year of 2000, it remained approximately 7.1% per year of college. The average treatment 
effect of college education was 11.85% in 1995 and 23.2% in 2002 in terms of the percentage 
return per year of college. 
Most of these estimate the return to education in general more so than tertiary education and 
focus on the return to years of schooling in the combined system. The incremental returns 
associated with tertiary education conditional on attainment of primary and secondary 
education have only recently received attention. It is the size of these which is critical to an 
assessment of the success of China’s educational transformation.   
4.2 Education as a filter/screening  
A critical issue in evaluating the effectiveness of China’s educational transformation policies 
is whether one views education in China as screening as distinct from human capital formation. 
A particularly important element in the Chinese case is that tertiary education, through entrance 
to foreign professional programmes is in part a visa obtaining mechanism for entry to high 
wage economies, and as such the private return to education in China may be influenced by 
this element in the educational process. Generally, the return on the international cohort 
provided to employers through education that arrives to employers is not reflected in available 
studies of the rate of return to schooling and as such estimates of the private rate of return 
understate the real rate of return. 
The main contributors to this discussion reflect the work of Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) 
who argued that higher education conveys information to employers about differing abilities of 
individuals and acts as a screening device, and hence educational processes may be viewed as 
providing a filter. Arrow suggested that the filter mechanism is useful to employers with 
imperfect information on individual (potential) productivities and college educations act as a 
double filter, once in selection (entering) and once again in grading. Arrow also suggested that 
mere admission to college may perform the screening function. Spence (1973) had earlier put 
forward similar ideas arguing that education was primarily served to select individuals, without 
 32really influencing their productivity in future professional life. Under this view a person’s 
productive efficiency is as an intrinsic quality, which may depend on a wide range of factors, 
but over which education exerts little influence. According to Spence, if productive efficiency 
is not observable by potential employers, then success as a student serves to signal the presence 
of productive characteristics. Spence (1973) argued that under this view of the world that if 
education serves solely to signal productive capacities to employers, workers have a tendency 
to overeducate themselves. The direct value added to society from education may thus be 
relatively small.   
Thus, if the educational process in China serves mainly as a mechanism for employers to 
distinguish between high and low attainment individuals, the return to education to employers 
lies in allowing them to sort individuals by ability, attitude and other characteristics using 
educational attainment. If this is the case, one can argue that the screening mechanism is best 
served by undergraduate education and graduate education adds relatively little benefit as a 
filter. If this is the case, then the component of China’s educational transformation focused on 
research and graduate training may be inefficient social investment.   
One can go further and argue that the significant increases in graduate education in China do 
little to enhance filtering, and only delay employment. One could even suggest that current 
high unemployment rates experienced by undergraduates in China generate political pressure 
for more graduate education as a way of absorbing (postponing) undergraduate unemployment. 
Data from Ministry of Personnel shows that in 2006 number of total graduates from higher 
education institutions hit 4 million but the total demand for college graduates in China was 
only 1.66 million. It implies that nearly 60% of college graduates faced unemployment 
following graduation.
30 Under this view, the radical changes which have taken place since 
1999 can be seen in part as a mechanism from absorbing undergraduate unemployment and 
delaying the eventual labor market adjustments associated with a large pool of younger 
workers entering the labor force with an additional 4 years of university under graduate 
education.  
Finally, a key issue for China that needs to be injected into this discussion is that educational 
screening in the Chinese case can also be for entry to foreign graduate schools and, eventually, 
                                                        
30 See  http://news.qq.com/a/20060716/001002.htm  
 33residence abroad in high wage countries. These returns are private returns to departees, but not 
social returns to China as a nation. They are not reflected in current empirical studies, and may 
dominate other components of the rates of return on tertiary education for the top portion of 
recent educational cohorts.   
The evaluation of China’s educational transformation policies therefore if in terms of its 
growth and efficiency contribution to the economy thus rests heavily on ones view of the 
educational process. Rates of return to education reflect different interpretations as to the 
nature of the education process. If education is viewed as screening more so than direct 
generation associated of human capital, then marginal benefits to employers need to be 
factored in as well as observed higher returns to workers through higher wages. As such 
education viewed as a screening mechanism may raise social rates of return beyond those 
generated empirically. 
 
4.3 Impacts of education on inequality 
A further element in an evaluation of China’s educational transformation policies is the 
impact of educational transformation on inequality. Fleisher et al. (2004) claim that changes in 
rates of return to schooling have paralleled rising income inequality, suggesting a link between 
inequality and schooling. According to Yang (1999), by the late 1990s China had surpassed 
most other countries for which data are available in rising income inequality, and by 2000 
China had one of the most unequal income distributions in the world (Yang, 2002).   
China’s unequal society has been the focus of recent studies (Li and Zhao, 2006; Yue, et al., 
2006). According to the data released by Asia Development Bank, China's Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.41 in 1993 to 0.47 in 2004,
31 almost the highest country in Asia and approaching Latin 
American levels. The income disparity between the households in eastern and western and 
coastal/noncoastal areas has also increased. The Gini coefficients for urban and rural areas 
separately are 0.34 (Yin et al. 2006) and 0.38 (National Bureau Statistics, 2006). Other studies 
show similar numbers. For instance, Wang (2007) uses China Urban Labor Survey (CULS) to 
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31  Economist.com: “Asia’s rich and poor”, Aug 9
th, 2007, from The Economist  print  edition.   Available 
online: http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9616   
 
 34calculate the urban Gini coefficient as 0.3969 in 2005 and 0.3476 in 2001. In other words, the 
Gini coefficient numbers are smaller among urban and rural areas, but if urban and rural areas 
are taken as a whole, the Gini coefficient rises to 0.47. This suggests that income disparity 
between towns and villages is a key element in inequality.   
A further statistic is that ratio of urban to rural incomes in China has risen from 1.8 in the 
mid 1980s up to around 3.3 or 3.4 today (Li and Luo, 2007). This change seems closely related 
to the major educational transformation underway in China since this transformation focuses 
on tertiary education rather primary or secondary. Also, the objective of maintaining growth 
through higher tertiary educational expenditures seems likely to intensify inequality issues in 
China. In turn, one can argue that increasingly educational attainment is now focused on rural 
rather than urban households, and the process of educational transformation may be a factor 
which will also progressively combat relatively inequality in China. 
According to Fleisher and Wang (2004b) and Heckman (2004), though there was a sharp 
acceleration in schooling expenditures in the previous decade in China, the proportion of the 
population attending college remained small. Fleisher et al. (2004) argued that the proportion 
of the population aged 20 and higher with a college degree in China was less than 3.2% in 
1993 and grew to only 3.5% in 2000 according to 1993 and 2000 population census (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 1994 and 2002). The more critical number, however, is the 
fraction of the entering age cohort who receives higher education and this is much higher and 
increasing. And even though the proportion of the total population with higher education is 
small, the magnitude of the population with higher education is large globally and the total 
number of higher education graduates in China ranks first in the world labor supply.     
 
4.4 Impacts on growth   
The evaluation of impacts of educational changes in China on growth performance is 
another central element in an overall evaluation of the impacts of China’s educational 
transformation. The issue is impacts both on total factor productivity and the rate of growth of 
labor productivity adjusted to account for changes in educational quality in human capital.   
Recent extensive literature on growth accounting in China (Li, et al. (2005)) has tried to 
 35understand the determinants of high growth performance in China and how growth 
performance could change in the years ahead as well as the role of various elements of changes 
in policy, and the changed international environment on the Chinese economy. Much of the 
literature applies simple growth accounting in the traditional Solow (1957) and Denison (1967) 
to the Chinese economy, and attempts to try to understand the primary determinants of growth. 
In recent years, work in this area by Shantong Li
32 underpins many of these policies set out in 
the 11
th 5-Year Plan in China which focuses on quality upgrading and specifically on 
educational transformation as a central element of growth.   
The original Solow paper on the U.S. used the time series back to the 1870s and used time 
derivatives of an aggregate production function to produce the famous Solow growth 
accounting equation that overall growth rates can be decomposed into a rate of growth of 
Hicks-neutral technical change and a weighted sum of rates of growth of factor inputs where 
weights are given by factor shares. Solow used long time series data for the US to come to the 
conclusion that approximately 85% of the US growth was due to technical change and not to 
the accumulation of factor inputs. If this view is also accepted for the Chinese case, how 
educational transformation will relate to overall total factor productivity growth becomes key 
in evaluating the impacts of China’s educational policies. Subsequent work however, 
challenged the Solow-Denison view of the world. Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) noted that 
changes in the quality of factor inputs would also play a major role in growth performance as 
educational input is one of those elements able to dramatically reduce the Solow residual by 
taking into account quality change in factor inputs.   
The work by Shantong Li on China comes to the conclusion that total factor productivity 
growth in China was a less central driver of growth as in the original Solow work on the US. 
Factor accumulation was a more major determinant of China’s growth. Using this work, the 
11
th 5-Year Plan sets targets that the proportion of growth to be accounted for by total factor 
productivity growth should rise to 60% and educational transformation is seen as a key element 
of this. However, other more recent work focused on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in China’s growth accounting decomposes the Chinese economy into FDI and non-FDI 
economy and challenges this view. Whalley and Xin (2006) provide a growth accounting 
                                                        
32  See Li, Hou, Liu, and He (2005). 
 36calculation for China which suggests most of Chinese total factor productivity growth over the 
last twenty years is accounted for by growth in foreign invested enterprises and specifically by 
foreign direct investment into the Chinese economy. Under this view the role of educational 
transformation in China’s growth would be significant diminished in terms of its potential 
impact on growth performance.   
Other work in growth accounting area involving Shai (2004) and Berges and Shai (2007) 
uses a dual approach rather than the original Solow direct approach as modified by Denison 
and also comes to the conclusion that factor accumulation in the Chinese case has been less 
central for growth than previously been thought. Thus growth accounting literature suggests 
that higher educational transformation in China in terms of its impact on growth has been 
influenced by international environment in which China has been operating with the role of 
foreign direct investment potentially and the significance of factor accumulation as against 
technical progress in terms of generation of growth an important issue.   
 
5 Potential Global Implications of China’s Educational 
Transformation 
In this section we discuss the potential global implications of China’s educational 
transformation. China is now a large entity in the global economy and the changes in China’s 
education policies since 1999 also have important implications both for global educational 
structure and the global economy itself.   
 
5.1 Changes in outputs of educated labor in China as a percentage of world 
supply 
The first is the impacts these changes imply for global labor markets, and trade in products 
incorporating skilled rather than the less skilled labor that has largely characterized China’s 
export growth thus far. In Table 12 we present data which indicates in broad terms the total 
supply of graduates by field of study both from OECD countries and China. The total global 
 37supply of graduates has been changing from the late 1990s through until 2003 (the latest 
complete data for OECD countries), and this enables calculations to be made of the global 
changes in educational outputs. The data in Table 12 clearly show that outputs in China are 
now a significant percentage of world supplies by area and profession. Moreover, the 
percentage changes reflecting China’s production of graduates has increased significantly due 
to the post 1999 educational transformation policies. In all areas, numbers of graduates in 
China are growing much faster than in the OECD countries.   
Table 13 reports data for Science and Engineering (S&E) Indicators 2006 published by the 
US National Science Foundation. In 2002, more than 9 million students worldwide earned a 
first university degree, and students earned more than 3 million of these in S&E fields. These 
worldwide totals only include countries for which recent data are available (primarily countries 
in Asia, Europe, and North America) and are an underestimate. Asian universities account for 
almost 1.5 million of the world's S&E degrees in 2002, and China provides a significant 
proportion of these at 15.77%. 
Nowadays many educated Chinese workers and those with educational skills remain in 
China constrained by immigration restrictions in the OECD. To the extent that economic 
activity in the OECD is relatively mobile and can move to China through outsourcing then the 
impact of China’s educational transformation activities becomes more important for global 
location of productivities. Since the 1990’s, there has been outsourcing of manufacturing of the 
U.S electronics and other industries. Initially outsourcing was to recontract manufacturing 
suppliers, and was mostly offshore and largely to China. Whalley (2007) discusses recent 
literature on outsourcing accessing what seems to be happening in China as China proceeds 
with her historic transformation of high growth and integration into the world economy. Much 
of the world’s commercial electronics are made in China, and outsourcing in this area in China 
is growing rapidly.
33 The educational transformation process in China will seemingly 




                                                        
33 See  Donahoe  (2003).     
 38Table 12: Graduates by regions and field of study from China and the OECD 








2003 (unit: persons) 
OECD 734798  628041  736417  266256 1072255  492492  101687 
China 466801  186251  685443  117900 293989  123563  53906 
total 1201599  814292  1421860 384156 1366244 616055  155593 
China (%)  39%  23%  48%  31%  22%  20%  35% 
1998 (unit: persons) 
OECD 596104  474693  654489  137904 665830  354287  115628 
China 197817  100202  329255  32034  -  66256  30656 
total 793921  574895  983744 169938 665830 420543  146284 
China (%)  25%  17%  33%  19%  -  16%  21% 
Growth rate (1998-2003) 
OECD 23%  32%  13%  93% 61% 39%  -12% 
China 136% 86%  108%  268%  -  86%  76% 
Source: OECD data from The UNESCO/OECD/EUROSTAT (UOE) database; China data from 
China Statistical Yearbook.   
 
Table 13: Field of first university degrees and ratio of first university degrees and 
S&E degrees to 24-year-old population, by selected region and country/economy 
(2002 or most recent year) 
Region/location 
Field of first university degree 













b 9057193 3384260 5672933 11.4  3  1.2
Asia
b 3224593 1496795 1727798 6.7  2.2  0.9
China (2003)  929598 533582 396016 5  2.6  0.3
India (1990)  750000 176036 573964 4.2  1  NA
Japan (2004)  548897 351299 197598 32  7.8  12.7
South Korea    239793 113097 126696 30.8  12.5  2
Middle East
b 445488 149600 295888 7.8  1.8  0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
b 174471 42291 132180 4.2  0.7  0.3
Europe
b 2682448 930192 1752256 29.1  7.7  2.4
America
b 2371031 717533 1653498 19.7  3.6  2.3
North/Central America    1827226 589999 1237227 26.6  5  3.6
Canada (2001)  128950 59915 69035 30  7.1  6.8
 39United States    1305730 415611 890119 33.9  5.7  5.1
South America    543805 127534 416271 10.5  1.9  0.6
Oceania
b 159162 47849 111313 49.9  11.8  3.2
China (%)  10.26% 15.77% 6.98% -  - -
Note: NS&E = natural sciences and engineering.   
a Number of degrees per 100 24-year-olds. 
b Includes only locations for which relatively recent data are available. 
Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2006.   
 
5.2 Global implications of incentive mechanisms used for academic 
performance in China 
The educational transformation now taking place in China also has major implications for 
both global academia and educational delivery in the global higher education market. The 
prime emphasis which is now placed on international publications in China has already 
resulted in large increases in paper submissions to international journals and paper submissions 
are likely to grow further in the next few years. According to a recent study “Key Figures 2007 
on Science, Technology and Innovation”,
34 China is now one of the largest producers of 
scientific output as measured by its share in the world total of peer reviewed scientific articles. 
In 2004, China is ranked fourth, and represents 6% of the world's scientific output (see Figure 
7). The shares of both the EU and the US have been declining in recent years, because of the 
rise of China and India. Chinese annual scientific output almost doubled between 1997 and 
2004, mirroring the rapid expansion and internationalization of the Chinese Science and 
Technology (S&T) system as well as the changes stemming from China’s educational 
transformation. Looking at the quality of scientific output based on bibliometric evidence 
(‘quality’ being primarily measured by the citation impact scores of scientific publications),
35 
China’s rank is not as high as its share of the world’s scientific outputs. Evaluated by the most 
frequently cited papers, China is ranked seventh, lower than South Korea, but still higher than 
                                                        
34  See “Key Figures 2007 on Science, Technology and Innovation—toward a European Knowledge Area”, June 11, 2007, by 
European Union.   
35  This reflects data extracted from the Science Citation Index (SCI) and related Citation Indexes on CD-Rom, produced by 
Thomson Scientific (formerly Institute for Scientific Information) and covering some 7,000 international journals in all 
domains of scholarship, with good coverage, especially in basic science. 
 40other large developing economies, such as India and Brazil.   
There are many comments now being voiced in professional circles in the OECD and 
elsewhere as to the stress already evident in the global process created by the rapidly growing 
volume of submissions to professional journals. Rejection rates are increasing sharply, and the 
quality of referring is even being called into question due to the volumes of submissions. There 
is also a tendency for relatively low status educational journals to grow in number. Papers on 
record are only a small fraction of those appearing in lower ranking international journals. 
 
Figure 7: World shares of scientific publications (%) 
(1), 2000 and 2004 
 
Source: From “Key Figures 2007 on Science, Technology and Innovation: towards a 
European Knowledge Area”, June 2007, Figure I.4.1, page 37. 
 
The contribution to this growing stress which may be attributable to the educational 
transformation underway in China is debatable but likely significant. And it seems likely to 
grow and be a potential source of instability in the global educational system going forward 
generating further changes in global educational structure.   
 415.3 Global implications of contractual arrangements in Chinese universities 
The contractual arrangements in universities in China are a further element of China’s 
educational transformation, and portend future global change. They are sharply different from 
those in the OECD. Before the 1999 educational transformation in China, teaching in 
institutions of higher learning effectively involved a lifelong employment contract, which any 
college or university could not override. But along with the changes in numbers of students in 
China’s higher education system, the tenure system for professors in universities and colleges 
has been changed significantly. The first changes were made by Peking University in reforming 
its deep-rooted academic tenure system, and this was followed by other Chinese elite 
universities. These reforms were implemented in February 2004. Taking Peking University as 
an example, the reforms are that only professors enjoy lifelong employment, and the university 
does not offer tenured positions to associate professors, lecturers and assistant professors. 
Associate professors in arts and sciences and lecturers in all subjects are offered employment 
contracts up to 12 years. If associate professors and lecturers fail in their promotions after 
appraisal and examination of their academic attainments within the contracted period, they are 
dismissed.  
  Contractual arrangements elsewhere in China’s universities differ even more from Western 
academic practice. It is now common for researchers and scholars in many Chinese universities 
to receive only 3 year contracts and these contracts differ sharply by individual circumstance. 
And individuals receiving contracts are often given quotas in terms of the number of the 
publications in designated journals which should be attained within a limited period of time. It 
is not uncommon for these quotas to specify 3 papers per year in international journals, 
although what is accepted as an international journal varies sharply from institute to institute. It 
is also the case that individuals receiving such contracts may be given payment directly related 
to publication performance. Again global incentives for paper submissions and papers 
publication are intensified by these developments.   
Since this new structure sharply differs from that in the OECD countries, it will likely 
produce pressures in the wider international community outside China for changes elsewhere 
because of the competitive pressures which will be created. Institutions in the OECD and 
 42elsewhere will likely have to react and eventually adapt.   
 
5.4 Impacts on the global supply and trade in ideas 
There are also implications of the educational changes in China for global trade in and 
production of ideas and products based on new ideas. Chinese integration into the global 
economy has, for now, been primarily in terms of trade in goods and services and flows of 
foreign direct investment into China. But along with the educational transformation in China, 
there is now a major focus on patenting, both in China itself and international patenting. The 
latter is to be both by Chinese residents and Chinese institutions, including Chinese universities 
and academies of science.   
There is clear evidence for this increasing tendency of China’s patent activity from multiple 
databases. These include the European (EPO) and US Patent offices (USPTO) database, 
China’s own database and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) database. For 
instance, China has seen rapid growth in patent applications. The most important (triadic)
36 
patents rose ninefold between 1995 and 2003 (see Table 14). China has recently joined the top 
ten countries filing international patents according to WIPO, with filings for 2005 having 
increased by 47 per cent compared to 2004. And while China still has relatively modest 
numbers of patents in absolute terms compared with the U.S., EU and Japan, its patent 
applications are growing rapidly.   
Recently economists have started to study international knowledge flows, or what one may 
call trade in ideas. Patents and citations data provide a proxy measure for trade in ideas. 
Inventions as a part of the international trade in ideas are a further focus of the educational 
transformation in China. New inventions and new ideas which are eventually to take 
commercially applicable form both in products themselves and methods of production are seen 
as an output. In turn, these patent related activities and the increasing number of educational 
attainees, is seen as a mechanism for also attracting increased foreign direct investment to 
further fuel Chinese growth.   
                                                        
36  The European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office. Because it is expensive to 






Table 14: Triadic patents by priority year and residence of inventor 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 
US 11062  11999  17440  19701 
EU-27
 (1)  9903 11328  16057  16108 
Japan 9904  9904  13086  13557 
South  Korea  67  325 644 839 
China  12 19 90  184 
Taiwan  10 23 77  108 
India  12 12 58 87 
Singapore 4  24  79  84 
Russian  Federation  21 51 66 59 
Hong Kong  11  20  33  40 
South  Africa  14 24 37 36 
Brazil 11  13  27  35 
Note: (1) EU-27 doesn’t include BG.   
Source: “Key Figures 2007 on Science, Technology and Innovation: towards a European 
Knowledge Area”, June 2007, Table I.7.1, page 47. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper discusses the changes taking place in China’s educational system since 1999 and 
particularly in tertiary education which we label as China’s Higher Educational Transformation. 
We attempt to document these changes and assess their implications. We evaluate what these 
changes may mean both for the global economy and China’s growth process. China may be the 
 44first case of a lower income country using major tertiary (rather than primary or secondary) 
transformation in educational delivery as a development strategy and on a scale in which is 
reflective of China’s growth rate and population size. This educational transformation starts in 
the late 1990s and may still only be in its relatively early stages. Potential major impacts follow 
for China, the global economy, and for global educational structure. These all reflect the 
increasing global importance of China’s educational system and the competitive impacts on 
global educational delivery. The implications are relatively little discussed in available 
literature, but will increasingly form a central element in China’s integration into the 
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